The Russian Question
- Miodrag Vlahović

- Jun 7
- 8 min read
Even Newt Gingrich, the former Speaker of the House of Representatives in the US Congress, who is considered by many to be the progenitor of the new American conservative right, which transformed Ronald Reagan's Republican Party into a populist party led by Donald Trump, spoke out.

Although he remained in the positions that give Trump the right even in his confrontation with the independent judiciary and in the extremely selective attitude towards the disobedient media, Mr Gingrich publicly reacted to the obvious ignoring, i.e. - even worse - the direct obstruction of the Trump administration's official efforts to stop the war in Ukraine - by Russia. The latest criminal bombings - drone attacks on civilian objects in Kiev and its surroundings - are a direct slap in the face of current American policy and its tarnished reputation in the world.
"Putin is attacking Zelensky's hometown and killing women and children. It is a deliberate insult to the United States and a test of how much dishonesty, brutality and aggression we can tolerate. He must be made to pay for it."
Thus, the experienced and established Republican (whose wife was recently appointed by President Trump as ambassador to Switzerland) stood out in the crowd of obedient admirers of the new US relationship with Russia, who are still not ready to publicly question the "genius tactics" that ("top negotiator") Trump and his vice president Vance promote as superior and unquestionable.
For now, Mr Gingrich has been joined in public - more by facial expressions and body language that indicate deep discomfort and anxiety - by the Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who, truth be told, at the recent ministerial meeting in Brussels, on the occasion of the anniversary of the NATO foundation, made it clear that the patience of the US regarding the need to establish a ceasefire in Ukraine is not infinite.
How seriously the “Master” in the Kremlin takes all this - is another question. There is no known or visible evidence of this.
Trump's "Russian policy", for now, except for heavy and, probably - at least for the current Washington administration - irreparable damage, has not brought any progress. In this sense, the historic (in the extremely negative sense) vote of the American delegation in UN regarding the resolution condemning Russia's aggression against Ukraine was also in vain, when the USA found itself on the opposite side of the one voted for by its allies and friends from the democratic world.
The fact that the latest economic measures - the imposition of huge tariffs on all partner and allied countries - with the exceptions that were impossible not to see (Russia and Belarus!), most seriously threatened the American economy itself, as well as world trade flows, is still in vain.
Thus Trump's pompously announced ending of the war in Ukraine - from "24 hours will be enough" during the presidential campaign - turned into long-term diplomatic and para-diplomatic outwitting and procrastination. (Which, of course, could have been easily predicted, even without special knowledge of diplomacy or the history of war conflicts.)
America's initial logic - to pressure Ukraine in all ways - from the attempt to publicly humiliate President Zelensky in the Oval Office, through the condition that he signs, in the old dictionary, an exploitative and extremely dubious contract on the use of Ukrainian mineral wealth, up to the short-term but dramatic denial of logistical and intelligence support to Ukraine in war operations - did not produce the expected results. Freedom fighters are hard to bluff.
At the same time, nothing was requested from Russia, at least not ultimately - so Russia did not even deliver anything. This, along with the latest Russian attacks that claim primarily civilian casualties, is a painful reminder of how much Zelensky, despite being faced with aggressive and blackmailing treatment in the White House, was up to the task.
Therefore, before Trump and his establishment is a much more complex and difficult task than the Republican Party, the White House and the State Department were ready to admit, at least publicly.
On the other side, things are not good either - far from it. Along with the questionable readiness of Russia to wage war effectively - Putin has just announced a new mobilization, 160,000 new (reluctant) soldiers are needed for the war effort that has entered its fourth year - there are also previously unrecorded situations on the Russian side of the negotiating table. Unrecorded in the recent past, that is.
Thus, the decades-long Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sergei Lavrov, who is accompanied at the negotiations by Putin's advisor, the former ambassador to Washington, Yuri Ushakov, was taken aback by the fact that his delegation at the negotiations with the American side - Secretary of State Rubio, National Security Advisor Mike Waltz and Special Envoy for Ukraine Steve Witkoff - and Putin's unofficial (!) envoy, President of the Russian Direct Investment Fund, Kirill Dmitriev.
Reports from Riyadh say that Lavrov was visibly surprised to see three instead of two chairs on the Russian side of the table. Trust is good, but control is even better, as Joseph Dzhugashvili would say.
The Russian question, that is the problem and the real reasons and intentions in the relationship with Russia, undeniably remain the central challenge of the foreign policy of the second Trump administration, even if there were no such Stalinist moves and maneuvers on the Russian side.
In the context of the large gap of the new nationalist and isolationist policy of the USA towards NATO, which is now on the ideological see-saw between distancing and abstinence, the relationship with Russia will indeed be the biggest and most difficult test for Donald Trump and his team - because through it the relationship with European and NATO allies is broken, but also, in the not-so-distant perspective, the relationship with China and other important factors on the international stage.
Whether, in that process, sobering up from ideological delusions and other (un)known limitations and burdens is possible - remains to be seen. If it is at all possible - after four years of the first confused mandate and after the first hundred days of the great implosionduring the second - it would be useful and good if it happened as soon as possible.
Useful for the USA, especially good for Ukraine, but also for Europe and the whole world.
It would be useful, should we emphasize - also for Montenegro.
For Montenegro, which has a government that is, in fact, a coalition of politicians and parties who admire Donald Trump (enthusiasts of the image and work of Ilon Musk and apologists, as they say, of the "mild right" AfD - Alternative for Germany - not to mention), and parties and leaders who are epigones, followers and henchmen - directly and indirectly - of Vladimir Putin.
The government in Montenegro is, thus, a small but plastic proof of why the ‘Trumpists’ and the ‘Putinists’ love and respect each other, or why they suffer and cooperate, with more or less enthusiasm. Between them (not only in our country, but let's dwell on it now) there is agreement and a common will and intention, which does not even have to stand out in order to be successful.
That is why it should not be surprising that Putin's nationalist right in Montenegro has no problem with the "neo-liberal", Trumpian megalomaniac ventures of the pro-Trump "civic" right, embodied in Prime Minister Milojko Spajić.
And vice versa - Spanić’s PES will not be very disturbed, nor will it oppose the continuous anti-Montenegrin policy and nationalist outpourings of the Serbian label, promoted by the group of parties led by the Chetnik duke Andrija Mandić, from the media and education to science and culture.
This symbiosis is logical and understandable even to the most ignorant voter: if the powerful Trump and the powerful Putin can work together, why can't their followers from the Balkan Montenegro? It even sounds modern: Montenegrin Serbs and new global and geopolitical realities!
That is why both will tolerate and believe in NATO just as much as they believe and want to be in the EU. Neither the first nor the second costs anything.
We are already in the Alliance (just like Hungary and Slovakia, they will say), and we are all, together, in favor of being in the EU. And there are Hungary and Slovakia, and AfD and Marine LePen, too. “Family values and freedom of religion”. European expressions and formulations are painless, but they are very effective. And do not require special effort.
The Brussels administration also fits into that pleasant picture, at least on the official and public policy level.
However, forced optimism seems to be present when it comes to NATO's side of the story. It is clear that the ruling coalition would like (or allow, anyway) a pro-Russian, i.e. Russian Montenegro to NATO. Empty rhetoric, with selective and targeted mourning of the victims on the occasion of the anniversary of the NATO intervention in 1999, which they do not call like that. Such a policy was read - from the Minister of Defense from the Democrats, to PES personnel in various positions - so the communication between the Alliance and the official Podgorica was reduced to a minimum, above which, at the moment, is only the new director of ANB, Mr Janović.
That is why Ms. Kaja Kallas, the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, will skip the Minister of Defense and the Security Sector Coordinator from the same party, during her upcoming visit to Montenegro.
Things are still different when it comes to Montenegrin's European agenda.
Representatives of the Brussels administration still believe that the current government can present the accession agenda. (Bidding by deadlines, in that context, has long been frivolous.)
EU Commissioner Marta Kos, her team, diplomatic representatives of the EU in Montenegro, or any of the European friends and allies who want to help us should not be hindered in this. They are aware of Montenegrin realities, mutual relations, limitations, omissions and mistakes.
Even what they do not understand enough - or it (often) seems that way to interested observers from Montenegro - is neither primarily their responsibility, nor their obligation.
The Trump-Putin coalition in Montenegro (in which, and it is true, some Albanian parties are also present, for their own reasons) has nothing against ‘Serbian Montenegro’ entering the EU - i.e. the kind of Montenegro that would be Serb-ized, i.e. identity and culturally conceived in the mold of Serbian nationalism. After the violent change of the Law on Freedom of Religion (“religious” counter-revolution) and the unconstitutional signing of so-called "Basic Agreement" with the Church of Serbia, the remaining issues are the introduction of the Serbian language and the dual (Serbian-Montenegrin) citizenship.
The latest (encouraging!) statement by Commissioner Kos that the issue of EU expansion (to the Western Balkans) has become a geostrategic one - if it is not the product of some incidental improvisation - is a basis for the hope that the EU's logic and approach towards the region to which we belong to and, therefore, towards Montenegro itself, will gain a new dimension and content - which will know how to recognize and separate declarative and demonstrative "Europeanism" from true and sincere commitment to the European agenda.
The "geostrategic question", nominated by Ms. Kos, as a definition, indicates the awareness that, without any simplification, the race is on whether the Western Balkans will, in the foreseeable future, be part of the EU, or, in another scenario, will remain at the service and disposal of the Russian World, even if it is called "Serbian" in the local/regional interpretation.
Europeans in Montenegro will support the European option to the end.
The answer to the "Russian question" was given by Montenegro several times, with a lot of effort and pain - from 1948, through 2006 and independence, until 2017 and membership in NATO.
The answer remains the same - if there is anyone to hear it.



